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FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO COPYRIGHT
AFTER ELDRED v. ASHCROFT:
THE DMCA'S CIRCUMVENTION OF FREE SPEECH
Rabeh Soofi*
1. INTRODUCTION
Last fall, as Eldred v. Ashcroft' approached the Supreme Court to challenge the
constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA'"),2 many
members of the legal community took the opportunity to protest the burden on free
speech posed by expansive copyright protections. 3 Like many of its predecessors,4 El-
dred argued that copyright provisions impermissibly chilled speech because they were
overinclusive and overbroad. The solution, according to Eldred, was to construe the
Federal Copyright Act as a "speech restriction" and subject it to the First Amendment
analysis developed by the Court.5
In spite of the attention given to Eldred, the Supreme Court decision turned out to
be a disappointment for free speech advocates. 6 The Court disposed of Eric Eldred's
claims simply by reciting its reasoning in earlier First Amendment-Copyright cases.7 As
Eldred demonstrated, the First Amendment challenge to copyright is one of the most
predictable in the Court's jurisprudence-it is almost always rejected.8 The problem
with this approach, however, is that the Court's dismissive attitude sweeps across copy-
* Candidate for J.D., University of Notre Dame Law School, 2004; B.A., University of Michigan, 2000.
I. 123 S. Ct. 769, 774 (2003).
2. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304
(2002)).
3. E.g., Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4
(2001).
4. See cases cited infra note 8.
5. See discussion infra Part II.A.
6. 123 S. Ct. at 790.
7. Id. at 801.
8. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Int'l., Inc., 241 F.3d 398, 408-409 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting First
Amendment argument); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445-60 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting
First Amendment argument); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1115-
16 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1486 (2001) (rejecting First Amendment argument); Penguin Books
U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor, Ltd., 55 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1680, 1696 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(rejecting First Amendment argument); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F.
Supp. 2d 1290, 1295 (D. Utah 1999) (rejecting First Amendment argument); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Henson,
182 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1105 (2000) (stating that the defendant's First Amendment
"argument fails in light of [the Supreme Court's decision in] Harper & Row, in which the Court stated that the
laws of the Copyright Act already embrace First Amendment concerns."); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that "free speech concerns are protected by and coex-
tensive with the fair use doctrine."); L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1453, 1472 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(stating that free speech concerns "are subsumed within the fair use Analysis").
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right provisions categorically, even though certain statutes pose a far greater threat to
free speech than others. This Note seeks to draw a distinction between the Court's
treatment of First Amendment challenges to "traditional" copyright protections and to
challenges to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). 9 The DMCA was
added onto the Copyright Act five years ago to address the threat posed to copyright
protections by the growing use of online communication.10 While cases like Eldred
emphasize the potential burden on free expression resulting from broad copyright pro-
tections, I would like to suggest that the blame is misplaced. The case for chilled speech
rests far better on the DMCA than the provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act or the
CTEA.
First, I will provide a brief summary of the Court's treatment of First Amendment
challenges to copyright in light of its most recent interpretation of the law in Eldred.
Then, I will introduce the DMCA and identify the problems that it presents for the
Court's current First Amendment-copyright jurisprudence. Here, I will also explain why
the Court's established framework fails when applied to the DMCA. I will conclude that
although the Court is justified in dismissing First Amendment challenges to the Copy-
right Act and the CTEA, its reasoning is unpersuasive and disingenuous when applied to
free speech claims against the DMCA.
II. COURT'S DEVELOPED FRAMEWORK FOR FIRST AMENDMENT-COPYRIGHT CASES
The First Amendment plays a few different roles in copyright cases. Frequently, de-
fendants in copyright infringement suits rely on the First Amendment as the last of a
series of alternative defenses." Alternatively, plaintiffs like Eric Eldred may also attack
the Copyright Act on its face, claiming that the federal statute is overbroad, or perhaps
over and underinclusive in achieving its ends.'
2
Applying the First Amendment to copyright cases has been a difficult endeavor for
a few reasons. First and foremost, it seems as though the two clauses achieve different
objectives. The First Amendment protects speech or expression from unconstitutional
state interference,' 3 while the Copyright Clause mandates Congress to encourage crea-
tivity and authorship by protecting the proprietary interests of authors.' 4 The two clauses
are not in dialogue with each other, which makes it difficult to determine the nature of
their relationship within the boundaries of "original" understanding. 5 While the Found-
ing Fathers may not have envisioned the First Amendment being used to challenge
copyright provisions, the Court has confronted this dilemma in two ways. It has ap-
proached the problem through the First Amendment lens by evaluating copyright as a
speech restriction and subjecting it to First Amendment scrutiny. Second, the Court has
addressed the issue through an "internalist" copyright framework, in which free speech
9. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 103, 1201, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863-65
(1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2002)).
10. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, I I l F. Supp. 2d 294, 331-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing
the threat of digital theft as a "propagated outbreak epidemic"); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d
II 11, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that the chief threat "to electronic commerce and to the rights of copy-
right holders was the plague of digital piracy").
11. See cases cited supra note 8.
12. 123 S. Ct. at 789.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. See generally Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970).
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claims are subsumed under Section 107's fair use exception to the rights provided for by
Section 106.16
A. First Amendment Analysis: Evaluating Copyright as a Speech Restriction
The Court's First Amendment analysis reflects the overarching goal of First
Amendment doctrine, which is to thwart regulations of speech based on message, ideas,
subject matter, or content. 7 By doing so, the Court prevents the government from "ef-
fectively driv[ing] certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace" by restricting mes-
sages with which it disagrees.' 8 Thus, the Court's First Amendment analysis often starts
by sorting the disputed regulation into content-neutral or content-based categories before
analyzing the restriction. Content-based restrictions, which regulate on the message of
the speech, are subject to strict scrutiny.' 9 Content-neutral restrictions, which control the
channels or "time, place and manner" of speech are evaluated under a lesser "intermedi-
ate" scrutiny.2 ° But despite the First Amendment's broad protection for free expression,
not all speech is protected. In fact, there are countless instances in which the government
eliminates and even criminalizes expression. 21 These forms of speech are excluded from
the First Amendment's protection because they do not advance the "goals" of free ex-
pression.
According to the most widely accepted theories, the "purposes" of free speech fall
into roughly three22 schools of thought: the "marketplace" of ideas theory,23 the theory
of democratic self-government,24 and the notion that free speech promotes individual
16. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
17. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
18. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116
(1991).
19. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1975).
20. Restrictions on the posting of signs on public property, or a ban on billboards in residential communi-
ties, for example, have been upheld by the Court because the restrictions have allowed ample alternative
channels for the speech. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988); Content-neutral regulations are far less
indicative of an ulterior government motive than content-based regulations. In many instances, content-neutral
regulations usually serve some kind of valuable purpose, such as regulating noise levels or maintaining city
property. See 487 U.S. at 486.
21. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1972) (holding that obscene speech is unprotected); Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (holding that "true" threats fall into unprotected categories of speech);
Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (holding that the use of force as a means of political reform
is an unprotected form of speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (holding that
incitement is unprotected).
22. Among the more popular theories discussed infra, scholars like Vincent Blasi have written that the
First Amendment's purpose in its historical context was to "check the inherent tendency of government offi-
cials to abuse the power entrusted to them." Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory.
AM.B.FoUND. RES. J. 521,528-538 (1977).
23. The "marketplace" theory focuses on the truth-seeking purposes advanced by a menagerie of view-
points and perspectives. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859), reprinted in THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A
READER, 58-65 (John H. Garvey & Frederick Schauer eds., 2nd ed. 1996). A diversity of speech enriches the
"marketplace" by providing listeners with the necessary information to choose between ideas. Id. Under this
theory, false or deceptive sorts of speech (such as misleading commercial advertising, for example) should not
be given protection by the First Amendment because they do not contribute to its truth-seeking function. See
also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market....").
24. Alexander Mieklejohn argues that the First Amendment is the foundation of political debate in the
"town square," resulting in a healthy system of self-government. Political Freedom (1960), reprinted in THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER, supra note 23, at 101-03. Similarly minded critics believe that allowing
individuals to express themselves is a prerequisite to the discussion of public problems, which would be
wholly ineffective if speech were abridged. See Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech: The People's Darling
20031
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self-realization. 25 Speech that contributes negligibly to these goals is considered "low-
value" speech unworthy of First Amendment protection.26 The government may freely
regulate unprotected speech as long as there is a rational purpose for the restriction.
To place copyright into this framework, we must first view the Copyright Act (or
any of its provisions) as a state-enacted restriction of speech. The restriction would af-
fect all speech that potentially infringes another copyrighted expression. In this hypo-
thetical scenario, our first task would be to answer the threshold question: does the re-
stricted speech (potentially infringing speech) deserve First Amendment protection? Is it
akin to "core" political speech, or is it more like pornography, incitement, or threats-all
of which are unprotected?
Certainly, there are arguments on both sides of the debate. On one hand, infringing
speech contributes very little to self-fulfillment, the marketplace of ideas, or healthy
political debate. After all, expressing one's beliefs does not require using the exact
words or medium used by others (copyrighted expressions). As harsher commentators
might argue, "one who pirates the expression of another is not engaging in self-
expression. On the other hand, certain types of expression lose meaning when ex-
pressed differently. The seminal case of Cohen v. California demonstrates the guttural,
expletive impact of "Fuck the Draft" written on the back of a jacket, which carries with
it all the vehemence of its wearer in three monosyllabic words.28
In fact, sometimes potentially infringing speech is striking only when taken in con-
junction with the copyrighted work. 29 Alice Randall's The Wind Done Gone, for exam-
ple, relies on Gone with the Wind to illuminate the stereotypes in the original work.30
Scholars point to these cases to demonstrate that speech should not be restricted when
the very purpose of its message is to critique a copyrighted piece.3' If the infringing
speech passes this threshold, it would receive First Amendment protection-requiring
Privilege, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT 324 (Eugene Volokh, ed., 2001) ("To give effect to the [the will of the
people], free thought, free speech, and a free press are absolutely indispensable. Without free discussion there
is no certainty of sound judgment; without sound judgment, there can be no wise government"); Cass Sun-
stein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 301 (1992) ("[T]he First Amendment is principally about
political deliberation.").
25. Martin Redish posits that free speech facilitates individual self-realization, which allows citizens to
attain knowledge and autonomy on an individual level. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 591, 593-94, 601-604, 627-629 (1982). See also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 777 n. 12 (1978) ("The individual's interest in self-expression is a concern of the first amendment separate
from the concern for open and informed discussion, although the two often converge."); See generally Martin
H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civil Republican Revival in Constitutional The-
ory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REV. 267 (1991).
26. See cases cited supra note 2 1. Incitement is considered to be low-value speech that contributes only
trivially to the marketplace of ideas. See Charles R. Lawrence II1, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, 77 (1993) (stating that certain forms of low-value speech, such as racist speech, "infects,
skews, and disables the operation of a market. It ... distorts the marketplace of ideas and renders it dysfunc-
tional.").
27. Michael J. Haungs, Copyright of Factual Compilations: Public Policy and the First Amendment, 23
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 347, 366 n. 122 (1990).
28. See 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that an epithet conveys "not only ideas capable of relatively
precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well"). See also City of Ladue v. Gilleo,
512 U.S. 43, 54, 56 (1994) (holding that some forms of speech are meaningful when expressed in a particular
way, i.e., display through the window of a residential home).
29. See Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1914) (holding that Rochlitz's photograph "Cherry
Ripe" would have had little value absent his earlier and virtually identical work, "Grace of Youth").
30. E.g., SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11 th Cir. 2001).
31. Netanel, supra note 3, at 47.
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the Court to subject copyright to its category-based First Amendment analysis. Here,
scholars like Neil Netanel have contended that the Copyright Act is a content-neutral
regulation that should implicate intermediate scrutiny because it does not discriminate
on the basis of subject-matter, viewpoint or substantive content.32
Unfortunately, the high Court has not been persuaded by arguments. As mentioned
earlier, it has refused to recognize a First Amendment right to use another's copyright
expression in almost every case. 3 3 Furthermore, the Court has steered clear of even con-
struing copyright provisions through the First-Amendment category-based approach.*M
Instead, it has largely dealt with the problem from an "internalist" approach that looks to
the Copyright statute to reconcile the two clauses.
B. Internal Safety Valves of Copyright
The Court has disposed of First Amendment challenges to copyright by pointing to
the internal limitations of the copyright statute itself. In the seminal case of Harper &
Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,35 the Court found the First Amendment inap-
plicable to the Copyright clause because the "internal safety valves" of copyright were
the functional equivalent of the First Amendment's protections.36 These safety valves
include the idea/expression dichotomy, the statutory restrictions on the subject matter of
copyright, and the fair use doctrine, all of which have served as limiting principles on
the broad grant of exclusive rights.
37
1. The Dynamic Idea/Expression Dichotomy
The idea/expression dichotomy is a concept that limits copyright protection only to
the form of expression, not the ideas expressed. 38 This concept was first raised by the
godfather of Copyright law, Melville Nimmer, who concluded that copyright and free
speech were perfectly compatible on a theoretical level. 39 Although copyright protec-
tions prevented new authors from making use of the copyrighted work, Nimmer wrote,
new authors were only limited in using that particular expression of the idea.n° They
were otherwise free to express themselves in unique ways. The greatest virtue of the
idea/expression dichotomy is the dynamic nature of its application. If an idea can be
32. This was not always the case. The court originally held that copyright would not be extended to ob-
scene or unlawful works. Later, Congress removed all content-based restrictions of copyright. See generally
Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1979).
33. See cases cited supra note 8.
34. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that there is no
overarching societal interest in obtaining free, copyrighted music); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,
III F.Supp.2d 294, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that Congress's interest in preventing copyright is
enough to justify restricting the freedom of speech).
35. 471 U.S. 539(1969).
36. Id. at 560 (holding that "[i]n view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copy-
right Act's distinction between Copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude
for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the doctrine
of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to Copyright").
37. Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1186-1204 (1970).
38. See, e.g.. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (stating that Copyright laws only protect the form of expression and not the ideas expressed).




expressed in a limited number of ways, the court pushes up the standard of infringe-
ment.4' On the other hand, if there is a much larger gap between the idea and expression,
the Court is quicker to find infringement. Thus, there are many instances where a new
work is not found to be infringing of an original work because the idea of the work is
expressed in typical ways. "West Side Story," for example, is not infringing of "Romeo
and Juliet" because the tale of "star crossed lovers" born into warring families is as old
42as time.
The dynamic nature of the idea/expression dichotomy undercuts the chilling of free
speech because of its flexibility. If the Court evaluated infringement with a bright-line
rule that found infringement after a particular number of "similar" attributes, works
based on ideas that were limited in the means of their expression would categorically be
at a disadvantage. In these cases the Court would always find infringement, which
would result in a de facto chilling of new works of authorship. The dynamic
idea/expression dichotomy restores this balance by requiring an unusually high degree
of similarity, which allows new authors to exercise their First Amendment right of free
expression without a fear of infringement.
43
2. Statutory Limitations on Copyrightable Subjects
Under the statutory regime of the current Copyright Act, important restrictions re-
duce the volume of material that is eligible for copyright protection. Although Section
101(a) is broad in its scope,44 Section 101(b) excludes all ideas, procedures, processes,
systems, methods, concepts, and discoveries from the realm of copyright.45 These cate-
gories of works are more functional rather than fanciful, which makes them of greater
use for public benefit than to one exclusive owner.4 6 The Court has not allowed copy-
right protections to extend to works without any fanciful attribute.
In addition to the fanciful/functional distinction, courts also have reserved news-
worthy and factual accounts for greater public use because of the "public benefit in en-
couraging the development of historical and biographical works and their public distri-
41. One particularly famous case, involving a jeweler who sought to create a pin in the shape of a bee,
illustrates this point. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that
the jeweled pin in the shape of a bee was not copyrightable because the idea and expression were indistin-
guishable). The Court found that since a jeweled pin bearing the shape of bee can only be expressed in a
limited set of ways before it no longer resembles a jeweled pin of a bee, the gap between idea and expression
is very close - the idea and expression are essentially merged. Id. A related idea is that of "scenes a faire,"
where copyright protection is not granted for items that are inherent in the circumstances described. See Cain
v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F.Supp 1013, 1017 (S.D.Cal. 1942) ("The other small details, .... such as playing
of the piano, the prayer, the hunger motive.., are inherent in the situation itself.").
42. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 120-24 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding the author of
"Abie's Irish Rose" not liable for copyright infringement of "The Cohens and the Kellys" which featured
substantially similar themes, premises, characters and plot).
43. M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.101B] (1989) ("lI]t appears that the idea-
expression line represents an acceptable definitional balance as between copyright and free speech interests.");
see also Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of
Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283, 289-93 (1979).
44. The Copyright Act protects literary works, musical works, dramatic works, panto-
mimes/choreography, pictorial/graphic/sculptural works, motion pictures/audiovisual works, sound recordings,
and architectural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
46. Several famous cases, such as Baker v. Selden, distinguish between artful works and works that serve
a useful purpose, such as books about proper bookkeeping. 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879).
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bution. ' 47 Copyrighting newsworthy events, such as an illustration of President Ken-
nedy's assassination for example , would be detrimental to the free flow of information
and to the larger interest in historical works.49
The Court has often pointed to these limitations in First Amendment claims because
there is a low likelihood that a work of immense use or value will be given copyright
protection. If only expressions that are artistic, fanciful, and creative are restricted for
use, there is very little chilling of "important" speech.50
3. Fair Use
The final "safety valve" of copyright may be its most important-the fair use doc-
trine. Pursuant to the exclusive rights awarded to copyright owners in Section 106 in the
current regime, reproducing, displaying, or distributing copyrighted works all constitute
infringement. The fair use doctrine subjects the rights granted by Section 106 to a broad
exception-that notwithstanding those rights, "fair uses" of copyrighted works will not
constitute infringement. The statute provides several factors to determine whether the
use of a work is "fair." These include: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use of the poten-
tial market for or the value of the copyrighted work.5'
While courts have used all of the factors in the finding of fair use, the last has often
been the strongest indicator.52 Although fair use does not extend to "innocent" infringe-
ments,53 it allows for criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), and even parody.54
The Supreme Court considers all First Amendment copyright claims to be sub-
sumed under the fair use doctrine.55 An individual may display, reproduce, distribute, or
perform copyrighted works in many cases, which makes copyright seem far less likely
to resemble a "speech restriction" than a protection of property or pecuniary interests.
By its very definition, a speech restriction (the Copyright Act) cannot truly "restrict"
47. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
Universal could freely produce a movie that made use of Hoehling's factual account of the Hindenberg crash)
(quoting Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966)).
48. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
49. In some cases, the Court has protected the effort taken to develop such information. Section 301(b)(3)
allows for state law to supplement copyright-related protections when not preempted by the federal law. 17
U.S.C. § 301 (2001). See generally International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 237-238
(1918) (holding that "hot news" is protectable under misappropriation); NBA v. Motorola, Inc. 105 F.3d 841,
845 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that state law may still protect noncopyrightable elements such as the transmission
of real-time game scores).
50. E.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 n.13 (1977) ("We note that Federal
District Courts have rejected First Amendment challenges to the federal Copyright law on the ground that 'no
restraint [has been I placed on the use of an idea or concept."').
51. 17 U.S.C. §107 (1994).
52. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
53. Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1962) (holding that defendants can be found liable even
with no intent of harmful infringement).
54. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (holding that 2 Live Crew's musical parody
of Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman" constituted fair use).
55. New Era Publ'n Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Our observation that
the fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of first amendment in the copyright field Ihas] never been repudi-
ated.").
2003]
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speech (by prohibiting speech that infringes copyrighted works) if it allows the speech
to be selectively used for specific purposes. As a result of its reliance on the "safety
valves" built into copyright, the Court has otherwise dismissed First Amendment chal-
lenges to copyright.
56
III. ELDRED'S CONTRIBUTION TO FIRST AMENDMENT-COPYRIGHT CASELAW
This past January, the Court issued its decision in Eldred, in which Eric Eldred
challenged the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.5 7 The CTEA was enacted as
a supplement to the 1970 Copyright Act by adding twenty years to the copyright grant
of Life + 50 years post mortem.58 Eldred claimed that the retroactive application of the
CTEA to existing copyrighted works chilled new speech that might have been based on
those works, had they gone into the public domain when the original copyright grant
expired.59
The District of Columbia trial court first ruled against Eldred, stating that it recog-
nized no First Amendment right to use of the copyrighted works of others.60 The Appel-
late Court affirmed, reasoning that copyright protections only granted the author rights
to the specific form of expression, not the idea itself. 61 The Supreme Court affirmed as
well, relying on the reasoning used in Nation Enterprises, in which fair use was consid-
ered to be the functional substitute for the First Amendment's protections. 62 Here, the
Court asserted that the CTEA actually enhanced traditional First Amendment safeguards
through two provisions.
63
The Supreme Court correctly ruled against Eldred for a few reasons. Most impor-
tantly, the Court's internalist approach to the issue was coextensive with Eldred's claim.
The CTEA may have extended the duration of copyright privileges, but it did not sub-
stantially enlarge them to the detriment of free speech. The additional duration of rights
posed no shift in the balance between the idea and expression, nor did it expand the
scope of copyrightable subject matter. In addition, the provisions of the CTEA actually
expanded the application of fair use in certain circumstances.64 Having to wait an addi-
56. See cases cited supra, note 8.
57. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 774 (2003).
58. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2002).
59. There is a great deal of evidence that companies such as Disney, the Gershwin Family trust, and other
groups lobbied their cause in front of Congressional hearings during early discussions of the matter. See Dis-
ney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20
More Years, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 1998, at 22; John M. Garon, Media and Monopoly in the Information Age:
Slowing the Convergence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 524 (1999).
60. Eldred v. Reno, 345 U.S. App. D.C. 89, 92 (2001); Eldred v. Reno. 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (citing Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 556 and United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1176-78 (D.C.
Cir. 1989)).
61. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 556 and United
Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1176-78 (D.C. Cir. 1989)); I MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § .10(D) (2002).
62. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 774.
63. § 108(h) allows libraries and similar institutions to reproduce and distribute copies of certain published
works for scholarly purposes during the last 20 years of any copyright term, if the work is not already being
exploited commercially and further copies are unavailable at a reasonable price; §1 10(5)(b) exempts small
businesses from having to pay performance royalties on music played from licensed radio, television, and
similar facilities. 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 110(1994).
64. Id.
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tional twenty years to use the works of others, the Court argued, was not a persuasive
First Amendment claim.
65
In a few ways, Eldred demonstrates that the Court's developed First Amendment
copyright analysis is still intact, offering little change in this field of the law. The Court
continues to rely on the internal safety valves of copyright to dispose of First Amend-
ment claims. Therefore, a successful challenge to copyright must implicitly argue that
those mechanisms have weakened to the detriment of free speech interests. However,
the Court seems to cling to its tried-and-true approach, even when it is clear that free
speech interests are in peril due to certain provisions of the Copyright Act, namely, the
DMCA.
IV. THE DMCA's CIRCUMVENTION OF FREE SPEECH
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act was added to the U.S. Code in 1998 to keep
66up with the threat that copyright owners felt due to the digitalization of mass media.
The DMCA strengthens copyright protections through a trifecta of provisions: 1) Sec-
tion 1201(a)(1)(A) is known as the "anti-circumvention" provision, which prohibits the
circumvention of any access control; 2) Section 1201(a)(2) is the "anti-trafficking" pro-
vision, which prohibits the trafficking of devices for circumventing access controls; 3)
and Section 1201(b)(1) which prohibits the trafficking of devices for circumventing
copy controls. 67 An access control consists of any technological provision that controls
access to a copyrighted work, and a copy control is any technological measure that pro-
tects any rights of a copyright owner. Violators face both criminal and civil penalties as
well as injunctions ordered by the court to prevent unauthorized access.68
While the DMCA claims to have not enlarged or modified the scope of copyright
protections,69 it has implicitly authorized copyright owners to use self-help measures to
protect their works. Authors may prevent access to their works by using encryption
codes, passwords, or other tools. Any individual who tries to circumvent these devices,
even for benign purposes, violates the DMCA. Although the DMCA has been almost
universally condemned by academics as an "ill-conceived" and "unsound" provision,
70
the Court has been given very few opportunities to weigh in on the matter.
A. The Court's treatment of First Amendment-DMCA Cases
Among the handful of cases that have challenged the DMCA on First Amendment
grounds, three are especially relevant: Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes,71 Universal
65. As Justice Souter asked plaintiffs counsel Lawrence Lessig at the Eldred oral arguments, there must
be a "possibility of a kind of a causal connection between the extension and the promotion or inducement for
the creation of some subsequent work" to hold the CTEA liable of burdening free speech. Oral Arguments,
Oct. 9, 2002, available at http://cubicmetercrystal.com/log/eldred2.html (last visited May 20, 2003).
66. E.g., Glynn Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813 (2001).
67. 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)-(b) (2001).
68. 17 U.S.C. §1203(b)(1) (2001).
69. 17 U.S.C. §1203 (2001).
70. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention
Regulation Needs to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 533, 562 (1999).
71. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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City Studios v. Corley,72 and United States v. Elcom. 73 Reimerdes and Corley both con-
sisted of complaints made by motion picture studio corporations against the distributors
of a computer code that decrypted DVDs.74 In Elcom, the manufacturers of eBooks, who
provided digital books for purchase and download, brought suit to enjoin Elcomsoft
from providing software that allowed the free distribution of eBook files.75 Examining
each of these cases will reveal the progression of the Court's First Amendment DMCA
jurisprudence as well as its shortcomings.
In Reimerdes, the first of the trio, the Court was presented with the first free speech
challenge to the DMCA. At issue was a decryption program (DeCSS) that circumvented
the encryption technology that movie studios placed on DVDs of motion pictures.76 The
writers of the code argued that their purpose was to provide for DVD compatibility on
non-Windows systems such as Linux. 77 They further alleged that the DMCA was uncon-
stitutional in its violation of the First Amendment. 78 The Court responded to this claim
in two ways. First, the Court pointed to Chief Justice Marshall's broad definition of
Congress's powers mandated by the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v.
Maryland.79 The Court argued that the DMCA was Congress's "technological means of
protecting copyrighted works" which "facilitate[d] the robust development and world-
wide expansion of electronic commerce. . .. ."8 Although the Court stated that this rea-
soning was alone sufficient to dispose of Reimerdes' First Amendment claim, it contin-
ued to analyze the DMCA through some sort of balancing test. Here, the Court found
that DeCSS sought to "render intelligible a data file on a DVD" which did "little to
serve [the] goals" of free speech.8' The Court balanced this against the DMCA's pur-
pose of "protect[ing] copyright in the digital age" and unsurprisingly, ruled in favor of
the DMCA.82
In the related Corley case, decided a year later, the Court modified its approach to
First Amendment challenges to the DMCA. In Corley, the Court replaced its balancing
approach with that of the First Amendment framework. 83 When Eric Corley challenged
the validity of the DMCA on First Amendment grounds, the Court revised its under-
standing of computer code-it ruled that computer code contained expressive elements
and constituted protectable "speech." 84 However, the Court went much further and
evaluated the DMCA through its First Amendment analysis, making Corley one of the
first cases of its kind. The Supreme Court, which had previously refused to construe
72. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445-459 (2d Cir. 2001).
73. See United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 11I, 1125-37 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
74. The original defendants in the lawsuit were Shawn Reimerdes, Roman Kazan, and Eric Corley, all of
whom owned or operated websites that were distributing DeCSS. 82 F. Supp. 2d at 214-15. Defendants Shawn
Reimerdes and Roman Kazan entered into settlement agreements with the plaintiffs. Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Reimerdes, I I F. Supp. 2d 294, 312 n.91 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The plaintiffs then amended the complaint
to include Eric Corley's company, 2600 Enterprises, Inc. as a defendant. Id. The remaining defendants in the
case were Eric Corley and his company 2600 Enterprises, Inc., which publishes a computer magazine known
as 2600: The Hacker Quarterly and operates a web site at http://www.2600.com (2600.com). Id. at 308-09.
75. 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.
76. 82F. Supp. 2dat 214.
77. Id. at 217 n.14.
78. Id. at 219.
79. 17 U.S. 316,324 (1819).
80. 82 F. Supp. 2d at 221.
81. Id. at 222.
82. Id.
83. 273 F.3d at 450.
84. Id. at 449, 451.
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copyright as a speech restriction, did so in Corley. The DMCA, as the Court argued, was
a content-neutral regulation which required only intermediate scrutiny. 85 Relieved from
meeting the high demands of strict scrutiny, the DMCA needed only to "avoid burden-
ing 'substantially more speech than [was] necessary to further government's legitimate
interests"' in order to pass constitutional muster.
8 6
In Elcom, the last of the three cases, the Court issued the most comprehensive
statement of its attitude toward the DMCA. As briefly mentioned above, Elcom involved
the distribution of eBook files without the "voucher" or "header information" that re-
stricted the use of the file to the computer purchasing the eBook. 87 The defendant, El-
comsoft Company Ltd. ("Elcomsoft") developed and sold a product known as the Ad-
vanced eBook Processor which stripped away the restrictions placed on each file, so that
eBooks could be copied, emailed, and otherwise distributed freely. 88 In its response to
Elcom's First Amendment challenge to the DMCA, the Court reiterated that computer
code did indeed contain expressive eletments that implicated First Amendment inter-
ests.89 Hoping to avoid the fate of r..-ey's First Amendment claim, however, Elcom
made a bold assertion-that the DMCA was not a content-neutral regulation, but con-
tent-based in its regulation of speech that circumvented access and copy controls. 90
Since content-based regulations must pass strict scrutiny, Elcom argued, the DMCA was
unconstitutional because it was not a narrowly tailored, least restrictive means of achiev-
ing Congress's stated purpose. 91 The Court responded by saying it could find no evi-
dence that Congress enacted the DMCA "because of agreement or disagreement with
the message it convey[ed]. 9 2 Instead, Congress sought to ban the code not because of
what the code said, but rather because of what the code did.93 With the "least restrictive
means" obstacle removed, the Court had no trouble upholding the DMCA.
B. The Death of Fair Use
The reader will recall that in "traditional" copyright cases, the Court almost entirely
avoided evaluating free speech concerns using the First Amendment framework-
instead, it relied heavily on fair use and other internal mechanisms to settle claims. 9 4 In
DMCA cases, however, the Court dismisses First Amendment claims just as quickly,
but seems to forget the emphasis it placed on fair use.
In Reimerdes, the defendant stated that developing DVD compatibility on Linux
machines constituted fair use, relying on § 1201 (f) of the DMCA, which permits reverse
engineering of copyrighted computer programs.95 Unfortunately, the Court found no fair
use, stating that Shawn Reimerdes did not merely reverse-engineer the CSS encryption
function, but that he circumvented a technological system in doing so, for which the
85. 273 F.3d at 454.
86. Id. at 455 (citation omitted).
87. 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1118.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1126-27.
90. Id. at 1127.
91. id.
92. Id. at 1128.
93. 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1128.
94. 471 U.S. at 539-40, 560.
95. 82 F. Supp. 2d at 218.
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reverse-engineering exception did not provide.96 This telling response to Reimerdes' fair
use defense illuminated the true effect of the DMCA on fair use-although fair use was
still technically available as an exception to copyright protections, it could not be used
in violation of the DMCA. Making fair use of a copyrighted work becomes impossible if
the work is protected by any access or copy control.
Corley brought this to the Court's attention and complained that the DMCA elimi-
nated fair use.97 But without explaining exactly why, the Court dismissed this notion as
an "extravagant" claim, merely stating that the Constitution did not require fair use.98 In
Elcom, as well, the Court stated that the Constitution did not guarantee a fair user the
right to the most technologically convenient way to engage in fair use.99 But despite the
Supreme Court's defensive responses describing fair use as more of a privilege than a
constitutional right, the Court implicitly acknowledged the weakening of fair use. In
Elcom, the Court stated that although fair use was still available, it was "more difficult
for such uses to occur with regard to technologically protected digital works."' ° The
Court seemed indifferent to the fact that the DMCA effectively abolished the fair use of
electronic works. A user who required a newspaper article would not be able to make
fair use of the piece if he sought to find it online, but would if he walked to the library
and photocopied the article.
C. The Unintended Right of Access
Although the court ruled against all three cases on both First Amendment and fair
use claims, it did so correctly with respect to the former. The Court may have ap-
proached free speech claims against the DMCA differently than those against copyright
provisions, but it came to the same conclusion-that there is simply no First Amend-
ment right to make use of the copyrighted works of others. Ultimately, it seems as
though challenges against the DMCA on First Amendment grounds are fatally flawed
regardless of the circumstances. As long as the DMCA's provisions are content-neutral
in application, the Court will adhere to an intermediate scrutiny test in which the DMCA
will always triumph.
With respect to the fair use claim, however, the Court's reasoning is exceedingly
unpersuasive. If internal mechanisms of copyright, like fair use, are to represent free
speech interests, then they must be rigidly supported. Instead, the Court argues that fair
use still exists, albeit behind the unwelcoming gatekeeper, the DMCA. Unfortunately,
its response to the complaints made by Reimerdes, Corley, and Elcom are inadequate for
a few reasons.
Above all, the Court ignores the effect of digitalization on mass media. While it is
easy to expect fair users to find non-electronic sources of copyrighted works, it is far
more difficult in practice. Keeping paper copies of newspaper articles, books, papers,
and other literary works is expensive and inefficient when compared to electronic stor-
age. Literary works that were stored in hard copy were moved to microfilm for archival
purposes a decade ago, and now have been transferred to permanent homes on servers,
96. Id.
97. 273 F.3d at 458.
98. United States v. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1I111, 131 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1134.
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CDs, and other storage devices. Authors who were unable to restrict access to their
works in hard-copy format now enjoy the freedom to take whatever measures necessary
to prevent a violation of their rights. Thus, the greatest tragedy imposed by the DMCA
is its creation of a right never conceived by the Copyright clause or the Copyright Act-
the right of access. Under traditional copyright principles, individuals are free to access
copyrighted works, but are restricted from displaying, reproducing, performing, or dis-
tributing them pursuant to § 106(a).10 1 The DMCA alters this by denying new authors
the ability to even view the copyrighted work.
As a result of this new right bestowed upon copyright owners by the DMCA, au-
thors may now ask for fees before allowing users to obtain access to works, such as ones
used by nationwide newspaper sites. 10 2 Worse, the DMCA gives authors leverage to
bully individuals into accepting "term of use" agreements as a prerequisite to access. 3
Moreover, if a user encounters a site that contains both copyrighted works and works in
the public domain, he is unable to copy or access the public work because of the
DMCA, even though he is entitled to do this. He must simply abide by the terms of the
author's access and copy control systems.
The DMCA has had a debilitating effect on fair use because fair use presupposes
access to the copyrighted work. After viewing the work, a user can make fair use of the
work under the guidelines of § 107 or take his chances by violating the author's copy-
right. However, the individual has always enjoyed the choice to decide the extent of his
use-something that is rendered nugatory by the DMCA.' ° 4 In this sense, the DMCA's
weakening of fair use has huge implications for Constitutional rights, including free
speech. It is dangerous to give private parties free reign to enforce their copyrights
through their own inventions because they are not bound to particular provisions of the
Copyright Act, such as fair use. The DMCA sought to give teeth to the Copyright Act,
but has created a monster instead. As described by the House Commerce Committee, the
DMCA encourages a "legal framework that inexorably create[s] a pay-per-use soci-
ety. '". 5 The Court's indifference to these issues is unacceptable.
D. Finding Fair Use in the DMCA
As many scholars suggest, the DMCA must be modified to resurrect fair use. 
°6
Professor Jane Ginsburg suggests that a close reading of § 1201(c)'s sentence structure
101. 17 U.S.C. §106(a)(2003).
102. See. e.g., THE NEW YORK TIMES, available at http://www.nytimes.com (last visited May 20. 2002):
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com (last visited May 20. 2002).
103. Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: Why Thomas Jefferson would love Napster, at
http://www.stayfreemagazine.org/mi/readings/siva-jefferson.pdf (last visited October 13, 2003) (arguing that
under the DMCA, copyright holders "could extract contractual promises that the use would not parody or
criticize the work in exchange for access").
104. The Corley court held that the DMCA contains exceptions for schools and libraries that want to use
circumvention technologies to determine whether to purchase a copyrighted product. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)
(2003). This includes individuals using circumvention technology "for the sole purpose" of trying to achieve
"interoperability" of computer programs through reverse-engineering, and encryption research aimed at identi-
fying flaws in encryption technology, if the research is conducted to advance the state of knowledge in the
field, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)-(g)(2003).
105. Netanel, supra note 3, at n.99 & n. l01; John R. Therien, Exorcising the Spector of a "Pay-Per-Use"
Society: Toward Preserv'ing Fair Use and the Public Domain in the Digital Age, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
979, 982 (2001).
106. Pete Singer, Mounting a Fair Use Defense to the Anti-Circumvention Provisions of the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. I II, 127 (2002).
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may place the DMCA under the same title as the Copyright Act, which would subject it
to the § 107 fair use exception. 0 7 Others like Professor Pete Singer suggest a federal
common law statute which would provide a specific fair use exception to the DMCA.108
The large amount of scholarship in this area suggests that the DMCA has wrongfully
attempted to cabin the constantly changing field of technology to the detriment of fair
use and free speech. Because of its robust nature and dynamic application, fair use has
been broad enough to allow for non-infringing uses of copyrighted works fixed in vari-
ous forms of media. Its strength should not be preempted by the overbroad and unduly
restrictive DMCA.
V. CONCLUSION
Although free speech advocates had great hopes for Eldred's First Amendment
claim against the CTEA, their efforts would have been far better spent on the DMCA's
burden on free speech. The Court had previously argued that the internal mechanisms of
copyright, especially fair use, had represented all free speech claims. However, it has all
but ignored the DMCA's deleterious effect on fair use. Without a robust fair use doc-
trine, free speech interests are unrepresented and in danger of being impermissibly bur-
dened. To correct this imbalance, Congress must fashion exceptions to § 1201(a)(1)(A)
and § 1201 (a)(2) of the DMCA so that individuals are allowed to determine the extent of
their uses themselves.' °9 Until then, the DMCA exceeds the scope of power granted to
Congress by awarding copyright owners two dangerous tools-the power to regulate
access to their works and a set of sanctions to enforce self-help measures, which ulti-
mately cause the greatest injury to free speech.
107. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Erperiencing Works: the Development of an
Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, available at http://papers2.ssrn.compaper.taf?ABSTRACT-lD=222493
(last visited October 12, 2002).
108. Singer, supra note 107, at 132.
109. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Proper. and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circunvention Regulation Needs to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 533 (1999).
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